Counterfactual Conditionals

Contents
Introduction: Counterfactual Conditionals in the Philosophy of Language
1. The Basics
1.1. Goodman and the Problem of Cotenability
1.2. Minimal Difference/Divergence/Departure: The Stalnaker–Lewis Semantics
1.2.1. Stalnaker
1.2.2. Sobel and Similarity: Lewis
1.2.3. Orthodoxy à la Kratzer
2. Challenges to Orthodoxy
2.1. Logics
2.2. Challenging Truth–Conditions: Gibbard Cases
2.3. Probabilities
2.3.1. Proposals in the Literature
2.3.1.1. Schulz’s Arbitrariness Account
2.3.1.2. Barnett’s Suppositional Account
2.3.2. A New Proposal: Non–Maximality
2.4 Problems with Similarity
2.4.1. Morgenbesser Case
2.4.2. World Convergence Made Easy: The Future Similarity Objection
2.4.2.1 Elga Worlds
2.4.2.2 Bennett Worlds
2.5. Typicality
2.6. Will and Were
3. Conclusion
Literature